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IN niE SUPREME COURT

of the

,

STATE OF UTAH

KAMAS STATE BANK,

A Utah Corporation,
Respondent and Plaintiff,
-

VS

-

J. BUYS CUMMINGS and
MARY CUMMINGS, et al.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Ca8e No.
9798

Appellants and Defendants. )
BRIEF

OF APPELLANTS

)
)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about the second day of January,
1959, J. Buys Cummings petitioned the Dis-

trict Court of the Fourth Judicial Di8trict
in and for Wasatch County for Letters of
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Adainiatration in the Estate of joseph
W. Cwlaings and Mary Ann CUIUliqs, his
deceued father and 110ther.

J.

Thereafter

Baya eu. . iaga was duly appointed M-

ainistrator of said estate.

The asaets of the estate consisted
entirely of the real property described
in the pleadings in this case.
The heirs of the Bstates of joseph

W. Cummings and Mary Ann Cummings, deceased, were:

J.

Buys Cu.nings

Wallace E. Cummings

son

William M. Cummings

son

John D. CWIIIlings

son

Nola .Pletcher

daughter

Sophia Langfore

daughter

Celestia Duke

daughter

Phyllis Peoples

daughter
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At the time of his death joseph W.
Cummings had encumbered the aforementioned

land with a welfare lien in the amount of

One Thouatnd Bight Hundred Dollars ($1800.00)
On the 30th day of April, 1958, Marion G.

Pletcher and Nola Pletcher, his wife,
joseph F. Bourgeois and Joan Bourgeois,

his wife, and J. Buys
Ann

(~,mmings,

Cumming~

and Mary

hie wife, formalized and

placed in writing an agreement theretofore entered into wherein the Appellants
herein agreed to sign a certain Quit
Claim

D~ed

dated April 3, 1958, convey-

ing the property subject

heret~

to Nola

Fletcher and Marion G. Fletcher as joint
tenants with full rights of survivorship
and not as tenants in common with the
understanding that the said Marion G.
Fletcher and Nola Fletcher would convey
the same to joseph F. Bourgeois and Joan
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Bourgeois.

Said grantees agreed to re-

tire the lien of the State Welfare Department of the State of Utah and pay
the costs of the probate.
The

Appellan~

in accordance with the

terms of said agreement signed said Quit
Claim Deed and the same was recorded in
the Wasatch County Recorder's Office on
January 6, 1959, in Book 34 of Records,
pages 224-227.
Nola Fletcher and Marion G. Fletcher
in accordance with the terms of the agreement then Quit Claimed the property to
Joseph Bourgeois and Joan Bourgeois on
the 5th day of January, 1959, which deed
was recorded in the Wasatch County Recorder's Office on January 6, 1959, in
Book 34 of Records, pages 223.
This Agreement which is Plaintiff's
Exhibit #5, was recorded in the Wasatch
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County Recorder's Office on April 27,
1959, in Book 34 of Records, pages 581-

The aboYe mentioned deeds appear

583.

of record as Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 3
and 4.
Nearly four months later joseph
Bourgeois and joan Bourgeois obtained a
loan from the Plaintiff-Respondent in
the amount of Pive Thousand Six Hundred
Thirty Five Dollars ($5,635.00) and on
the same date, August 5, 1959, executed
and delivered to the Respondent a Mortgage on the above property as security
for the payment of the aforesaid obligation.
The proceeds of this loan were used
to pay off the Welfare lien, property
tL~es,

home improvement loan obtained

by joseph Bourgeois for materials for
improvement, for recording costs, title
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insurance to secure the loan, and the
aforesaid costs of probate with the balance going to Joe Bourgeois and his wife.
In accordance with the terms of the
aforesaid Agreement, joseph Bourgeois
and joan Bourgeois on November 21, 1961,
conveyed the aforesaid property by Warranty Deed to J. Buys Cummings and his
wife, which deed was recorded November 27,
1961, in Book 41 of Records, page 286 of
the Wasatch County Records.

In exchange

for this Warranty Deed the Appellants
tendered to the Defendants Joseph Bourgeois and Joan Bourgeois and the Respondent, Kamas State Bank, the payment
for the said property in the amount of
Four Thousand Eighty Dollars ($4,080.00).
This tender was refused by the Respondent
and the Mortgage being in default, the
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Respondent commenced this suit to foreclose the Mortgage.

The Appellants coun-

terclaimed for a decree quieting title as
against the Respondent.

The matter came

on for pre-trial and during said pre-trial
Respondent moved the court for Summary
Judgment.

The trial court asked for written

briefs which were submitted.

Upon receipt

of these briefs the Motion for Summary
Judgment was granted, the Court stating as
its grounds that the aforesaid agreement
constitutes a promissory restraint on
alienation and is void as against public
policy.

The court then heard evidence on

the extent of the debt and entered its
decree of foreclosure.

There has been no

opportunity for the Appellants to present
evidence concerning the terms or validity
of said option agreement.

The Findings
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of Fact approved by the Court were nondisputed facts stipulated to by counsel
for the aid and benefit of this Court.
on appeal.

All facts in dispute do not

appear.
The provision in the agreement in
question reads as follows:

•.l

"If, at any time, the said Marion G.
Fletcher, Nola Fletcher, joseph F.
Bourgeois and joan Bourgeois or any
of them determine that they shall
sell said premises, before they shall
sell them to any other person, they
hereby agree to permit the said J.
Buys Cummings and Mary Cummings to
purchase the same for an amount equal
to the principal amounts which they
have paid on the above referred to
State Welfare Lien, together with
the value at the time of all permanent capital improvements placed
upon said premises. Parties further
agree that this right shall constitute
a lien against said property for and
during the period of the life of J.
Buys Cummings, but that upon his decease, such rights shall terminate".
ARGUMENT 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE
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OPTION AGREEMENT VIOLATES THE RULE
AGAINST RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION
The trial court, in granting the
Summary Judgment of the Respondent, relied upon the rule set forth in the
Restatement of Property, Restraints ~ 413
(2)(a).

The comment on~ 413 (2)(a) on

page 2444 was specifically pointed out.
The Court found as a matter of law that
since the terms of the agreement in question called for the purchase at a fixed
price, it violates the rule as therein
set forth.
There was no opportunity afforded
Appellants to submit evidence that would
fulfill the requirements of the recognized
exception to said rule as set forth therein.
It is acknowledged that the Restatement is not necessarily law in Utah, but
since such reliance was placed

thereo~

by
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the trial court, further development seems
appropriate.

~

413 states as follows:

(1) A promissory restraint or forfeiture restraint on the alienation of a
legal estate in land which is in the form
of a provision that the owner of the estate shall not sell the same without first
offering to a designated person the opportunity to meet with resonable expedition, any offer received, is valid, unless
it violates the rule against perpetuities.
(2) A promissory restraint or forfeiture restraint on the alienation of a
legal estate in land which is in the form
of a provision
(a) that the owner of the estate shall
not sell the same without first offering
to sell to some designated person, either
at a fixed price, or at a percentage of the
price offered by another person, or
(b) that the owner of the estate shall
pay a certain percentage of the sale price
to some designated person,
is valid if, and only if, the restraint is
valid under the rules stated in ~ 406-411.
The Restatement recognizes as valid
a restraint that requires the sale at a
fixed price if it fulfills the rules
set forth in Restatement of Property,
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Restraints, ~~ 406-411.
§ 406 sets forth the rules for

validity of such restraints as applied
to indefeasible possessory estates in
fee simple, to-wit:
§ 406. Subject to the exception
stated in s 413(1) (preemptive provision),
a restraint on the alienation of a legal
possessory estate in.fee simple which is,
or but for the restraint would be, indefeasible is valid if, and only if,

(a) the restraint is a promissory
restraint or a forfeiture restraint, and
(b) the restraint is qualified so
as to permit alienation to some though
not all possible alienees, and
(c) the restraint is a reasonable
under the circumstances, and
(d) if the restraint is a forfeiture restraint, the requirements of the
rule against perpetuities are satisfied.
Application of the agreement in
question clearly demonstrates that we
have at bar a promissory restraint not
restricted as to possible alienees, and
s

that s 406(d) is not applicable.
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The question remaining under these
rules is whether or not the restraint is
reasonable under the circumstances.

We

quote from Comment pages 2406, 2407:
"· . • The following factors, when
found to be present, tend to support the
conclusion that the restraint is reasonable:
1. the one imposing the restraint has
some interest in land which he is seeking
to protect by the enforcement of the restraint;
2.
ation;

the restraint is limited in dur-

3. the enforcement of the restraints
accomplishes a worthwhile purpose;
4. the type of conveyances prohibited
are ones not likely to be employed to any
substantial degree by the one restrained;
5. the number of persons to whom
alienation is prohibited is small (see
Comments j and k);
6. the one upon whom the restraint
is imposed is a charity.
The following factors, when found to be
present, tend to support the conclusion that
the restraint is unreasonable:
1.

the restraint is capricious;

2.

The restraint is imposed for spite
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or malice;
3. the one imposing the restraint
has no interest in land that is benefited
by the enforcement of the restraint;
4. the restraint is unlimited in
duration;
5. the number of persons to whom
·alienation is prohibited is large (see
Comments j and k).

Applying this to the case at bar,
Appellants if given an opportunity to
present evidence will prove:
A.

That Appellants are attempting to

protect their inheritance from the estates
of Joseph W. Cummings and Mary Ann Cummings, the consideration given for said
option.
B.

That the option does not last

beyond the life of J. Buys Cummings and
that at the time of the execution of said
agreement the said J. Buys Cummings was
an elderly man.
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C.

That in addition to the pro-

tection of said inheritance aforeaaid,
the purpose of the agree•ent waa to assist
the indigent grantees.

The evidence will

show that at the time of the execution of
said agreement, joe Bourgeois and his
faaily were destitute and that they lacked
the mini•um necessities of life, including
a roof over their head.

The arrangement

worked out aade it po8eible to obtain a
home at a cost fer below the market value
of the property.

It was feared by the

heirs that should joe Bourgeois be permitted to dispose of this property, either
volintarily or involintarily, then before
very long his dependants would again
out of a home.

be

The Appellants contem-

plated that so long as said property was
employed as a

home for the family of

this
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man, they would forego realization of
their inheritance.

Subeequent facts

tend to ahow that the fears of these
heirs were not unfounded.
D.

There is no restriction affecting

the number of persons who may purchase
said property except as exiats with any
valid option.
B.

That the type of conveyance is

in no way limited.
P.

That the restraint is in no way

capricious or imposed for spite or malice.
A definite purchase price or the mode of
determining purchase price are accepted
requirements for the validity of such
agreements.

See Annotation at 117 ALR

1095.
ARGUMENT II
THE TRIAL OOURT ERRED IN NOT PERMITTING
APPELLANTS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OP A PO'l'1NSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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BY THE MORTGAGE

TO RESPONDENT

The court had before it evidence
that the purchase price was Four Thousand
Eighty Dollars ($4,080.00) under the
agreement and evidence that the market
value of said property was much more. Facts
before the court make it clear that Joe
Bourgeois, Joan Bourgeois and the Respondent were fully aware of the divergence
between the option price and market price.
The Findings of Fact #10 leaves little
doubt that the Respondent was aware of
the purchase price because it handled the
payout of the sums constituting the purchase price under said agreement.

The

Appellants submitted proof (affidavit of
John L.

Chid~ster)

that not only did Re-

spondent have constructive knowledge of
said option, but also had actual knowledge
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thet eof.
Appellants should be given an opportunity to present evidence that may show
that the Reepondent was participating in
a fraud designed to get around the option
agreement and thereby defeat the interest
of the Appellants.
ARGlJM.mT I I I
TilE RESPCJtlDPNT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING

TO

ATIACK THE TRANSFER PROM JOE BOURGEOIS AND
JOAN BOURGEOIS TO

J.

BUYS

CU~INGS

AND

MARY CUMMINGS

The evidence before the court construed most favorably for the Appellants
shows that the Appellants entered into
an agreement feeling that they had a
binding and valid option.

It may also be

concluded that all parties with out fraud
or collusion felt they had bound themselves to a valid option.

The Respondent,
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after actual notice of said option, made
no effort to subordinate the interest of
the Appellants to the mortgage or to determine whether or not the Appellants
felt they had a binding option.
There was no effort on the part of
the Respondent to determine whether or
not the Appellants were prepared to purchase the property at the time of the
mortgage.

There was no notice given

Appellants of the loan.
The parties to said agreement in no
way contest the terms or the validity of
said option agreement.

There has been no

evidence presented by Respondent of a
fraudulent conveyance.

The prevailing

rule is set forth in 24 Am. Jur., Fraudulent Conveyances ~ 145, to-wit:

"

creditors who have contracted

debts under such circumstances that knowSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ledge of previous voluntary transfers
must be imputed to them cannot be regarded as hindered, delayed or defrauded
by such transfers, and therefore, they
may not attack such conveyances for the
ourpose of obtaining collection of their
debts."
The Respondent was aware of the
equitable interest in the Appellants and
aware that it may ripen into full legal
title.

It would appear that Respondent

would thus not be in a position to contest the transfer for the collection of
this debt.
Such option agreements are recognized
as valid in Utah.

Cummings et ux. vs.

Nielson et al., 42 Utah 157.

They are

also protected as any other interest in
real property by the Recording Act, Knight
vs. Chamberlain, 6 Utah 2d 394, 315 P2d
273.
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Por a general treatment of intervening
salea or

~ortgages

that conflict with a

prior recorded option see 50 ALP 1315

(1)

Interv~ing

Sale or Mortgage.

ARGUM.EN'l' IV

RESPONDENT IS NOT BEFORE THE COURT WITH
CLFAN HANDS

The Respondent is before the court
attempting to set aside the option agreement under the following circemstances.

A.

It relies upon a legal technicality

to attempt to defeat the interest of
Appellants.
B.

lt hfld actn.al k1owJei1ge of the

in t e r e s t of Ar ~, e 11 a.n t s .

G.

1 t f a i 1 e d to ma ke any effort to

determine whet;1,?r or no*" the parties felt
bound by the terms of
D.

feat sairt

s~id

option.

It determined to attempt to deinte~est

of Appellants on said
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legal technicality.
E.

Had it made any effort to inquire

it could have determined that the parties
to said agreement felt they had intered
into a valid option.
F.

It seeks merely to protect the title

insurance company, the agent of whom determined that they would take the risk (see
affidavit of John L. Chidester) in making .
said loan.
AAG~mTV

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE IT
HAD BEFORE IT DISPUTED FACTS CONSTITUTING
A VALID DEFENSE IF TRUE.
The affidavit of John L. Chidester
presen~s

sufficient evidence to raise

the issue of a fraudulent conveyance.
The stipulated Findings of Fact, together with the terms of the agreement are
sufficient to raise the issue of whether or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tests set out in the Restatement, supra.
The aforementioned affidavit presents sufficient evidence to raise the
issue of the Respondents standing to
attempt to set aside the option.
The requirements of Rule 56, Utah
Rules of Civil Proceedure leave little
doubt that the granting of a motion for
Summary Judgment must be based upon the
undisputed facts and that if any material
fact is disputed such motion will not lie.
Disabled American Veterans vs. Hendrixson
et al., 9 Utah 2d 152, 340 P2d 416.

In

the case of Bullock vs. Desert Dodge
Truck Center, Inc., 11 U2d 1, 354 P2d 559,
the court stated as follows:
"A summary judgment must be supported
by evidence, admission and inferences
which, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the loser, show that "there
is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
to~ judgment as a matter of law,"
such
showing must preclude all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a
trial produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor."

The Respondent failed to produce any
evidence that would show that the agreement in question does not fulfill the requirements of the Restatement, supra.
CONCLUSION
The Court erred in granting the motion
for summary judgment as

there are material

issues raised upon which the facts are in
dispute.
Respectfully submitted,

HATCH & CHIDESTER
Attorneys for Appellants
and Defendants
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